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Abstract        
We start our exploration of China’s institutional change by asking what the China 
experience can tell us about institutional economics and organization theory. We point to 
under-researched areas such as the formation of firms and the interplay between firms 
and local politics. Our findings support the dynamic capability approach which 
concentrates on activities rather than on pre-defined groups and models institution 
building as a co-operative game between the local business community and local 
government agencies. We find that the analysis of firms has to set in before they are 
formed by entrepreneurs and networks and we identify political management as a core 
competence of these two groups. While this contradicts the conventional view of 
clientelism or principle agent relations as institutional building blocks, we don’t propose 
competing models. Instead, we suggest focusing on a dynamic process in which the role 
of players can change. Faced with the spontaneous emergence of institutions, our concept 
of institutional architecture captures the fact that the two models can co-exist side by side 
and that, once the dichotomy between formal and informal institutions is given up, there 






institutional change, entrepreneurship, networks, dynamic capabilities, diversity and 
convergence of institutions.   
China’s institutional architecture: a New Institutional Economics and Organization 




Reform China poses a challenge to social scientists trying to use their analytical toolkits 
to explain institutional change and economic transformation. The dramatic change of 
China’s economic system has stimulated some useful theoretical controversies (Roy et al 
2001; Tsui et al. 2004). In organization theory the controversy started between cultural 
approaches (e.g. Hofstede 1998; Redding 1990) and institutional theory (Meyer and Peng 
2005); in economics between the neo-classical approaches and institutional economics 
(Lipton and Sachs 1990; Grabher and Stark 1997; Hodgson 1993). Over the years when 
more “observations” of transformation processes and compatible data sets from European 
transition economies became available, the necessity to pay attention to the institutional 
context became obvious (see for example OECD 2005, see also Rodrik 2007; Stiglitz 
2002). The Comparative Business Systems literature and macro-economic comparative 
studies have shown that emerging markets and transition economies do not merely 
represent a data (sub-) set of conventional assumptions about firms and their behavior 
(Djankov et al. 2003; Whitley 2007). Different institutional frames whether emerging 
markets, transition economies or market economies lead to different organizational forms 
of firms and different strategic decisions, adding to the diversity of firms that can be 
observed worldwide. The institutional debate among economists proceeded from the 
early North (1990) definition where institutions are the rules of the game and captured by 
transaction costs to including economic organizations as suggested by Williamson (see 
overview 1991). In the case of China, the question is how economic actors respond to the 
decentralization of decision making power and control over resources with which the 
reforms have started in 1978: How does a non-socialist sector emerge? What new 
organizational forms of firms can be observed in the non-state sector? How do these 
firms interact with each other and their business environment? New Institutional 
Economics (e.g. North 2005; see also www.isnie.org) aimed at explaining both the 
organizational dynamics, i.e. Hayek’s “spontaneous order” as initiated and shaped by the  
new economic actors, as well as institutional change as initiated in the political arena and 
stipulated in laws or (Communist) Party directives (Aoki 2007; Barzel 2002). We use the 
term ‘institutional architecture’ to denote the institutional framework which encompasses 
both spontaneous order and politically defined incentives and constraints in order to 
avoid confusion with the conventional legalistic definition of institutional structures 
which emphasizes national legislation and property rights. In an environment of 
economic transformation and institutional change this institutional architecture cannot be 
static. Its dynamism refers to the process by which new organizational forms of firms 
emerge, social relations are selected for business purposes, and political–business 
interaction is established by creating new and harnessing existing social and political 
structures including national legislation.  
 
Yet, so far the complementary question has not been raised: what can the China-
experience, i.e. observations and the findings of empirical research, add to the body of 
knowledge in institutional analysis. This is what this paper attempts to do, stimulated by 
some puzzles resulting from the China-experience. They can be summarized in four 
points: 
 
(1) How do we explain the quick emergence of entrepreneurship and new non-
socialist firms in an environment of non-existing (until 2004) formal private 
property rights and massive state intervention in the operation of firms? How do 
we explain the emerging diversity of organizational form of firms in the nascent 
private sector, in particular the fact that the diversity of firms can be greater 
within one industry than across sectors and industries? 
(2) If culturally determined forms of networking (guanxi) are the crucial co-
ordinating mechanism and therefore the comparative advantage of Chinese 
economic actors, by which they respond to ill-functioning markets, how do we 
then explain the diversity of network and network activities within China, let 
alone the fact that networking co-exists with market exchange, and competition? 
(3) How do we explain that firms and networks involve political agents as members 
or owners? Why do these forms of corporate governance facilitate private  
entrepreneurship instead of rent-seeking, corruption and high entry barriers into 
industries? Why have private entrepreneurs embedded in local business 
environments become the preferred partners for domestic and international firms, 
private and public companies? 
(4) How is the organizational dynamics at the micro-level linked to macro-level 
institutions? What happens when localism, embeddedness and corporate 
governance rather than national legislation, formal property rights and national 
markets define organizational dynamics? How do we account for the continued 
co-existence of formal and informal institutions when transaction cost analysis 
suggests that informal institutions, such as the use of guanxi, are transitory and 
will disappear with increasing wealth and increasing market competition? 
 
Below we will summarize accepted views on institutional change in China with special 
emphasis on these four puzzles. We will start by outlining what we mean by institutional 
approaches. Using the terminology of North and Williamson we will refer to the field as 
New Institutional Economics (NIE). Originating from the neoclassical paradigm NIE 
stands for a research platform that includes concepts from organization theory, sociology, 
political science, social psychology, experimental economics and institutional game 
theory. Though partly overlapping, we keep organizational theory apart in order to 
account for its insights in the interaction between firms and their environment, as found 
in the management science and here in particular the strategic management literature.  
 
In proposing an overarching interpretation of China’s institutional change, we emphasize 
the linkage between firms and networks, i.e. the spontaneous order, and politically driven 
institutions, i.e. the formal institutional order. We will identify gaps in the literature, as in 
the case of entrepreneurship; suggest specifications of existing forms of networks, as in 
the case of non-structured, yet strategy-driven networks. The conceptual use of 
institutional architecture propels a complementary research agenda which acknowledges 
organizations as initiators of institutional change, the co-existence of formal and informal 
institutions, and dynamic processes underpinning institutional change. 
  
The field: Towards a broader notion of institutions 
 
China’s economic transformation has spawned so many concepts and approaches within 
the social sciences that any singling out of specific concepts in our summary can be seen 
as a “random selection”. Yet, seen from the NIE perspective the concepts used follow the 
academic discourse in the last 20 years within economics and what came to be known as 
Neo-institutionalism (Kato 1996). Research on emerging markets and transition 
economies pointed to the explanatory weakness of the early North (1990) and Williamson 
(1985) definitions of transaction costs and hybrids which failed to explain the diversity in 
organizations such as firms and the emergence of market conforming (or not conforming) 
institutions. In response, new and related research agendas produced new forms of 
institutional analysis. First, acknowledging that Public Choice (overview: Mueller 1989) 
whose findings are based on parliamentary democracies and therefore incompatible with 
emerging markets and transition economies can nevertheless contribute to the explanation 
of institution building and change. It provides concepts for “de-composing” the 
institutional frame by drawing attention to the allocation of regulatory power within one 
economy. For China the concept of Fiscal Federalism offers an analytical design for 
explaining the diversity of local business systems and jurisdictional (Qian and Weingast 
1997) or yardstick competition (e.g. Besley and Case 1995) in attracting FDI (e.g. Huang 
2003) and securing private property rights. The literature on collective action, shows 
further that the emergence of institutions does not only depend on the decentralization of 
regulatory power, but also on the local interaction between the political and the economic 
sector and new forms public-private partnerships (Olson 1969; Ostrom 1990).  
 
The insights from Public Choice and theory of collective action also show that focusing 
on sub-national development and interaction is not just a shift in the unit of analysis from 
the national to the local level (for China see Li 2005), but implies that firms can be 
initiators of change and institutional entrepreneurs and not just recipients of institutional 
constraints and change. Firms contribute to institution building when agreeing on 
business routines or colluding with local government agencies to “negotiate” regulations, 
subsidies, or even  taxation (Li et al. 2006). This analysis led to the State-capture (Laffont  
and Tirole 1991; Frye and Shleifer 1997) vs. State-seizure (Shleifer and Vishny 1998; 
Frye 2002) controversy which centers around the question whether and to which extent 
the alliance between the local business community and the local state can weaken the 
national government (as observed in China in the 1990; for Russia see Litwack 2005) 
where it helps to explain the emergence of a very specific institution, namely tax 
contracting (tax farming) between the local state and firms (Zhu and Krug 2007; Brean 
1998). If institution building is no longer the outcome of the political process alone, then 
identifying the agents of change and their interaction becomes crucial for the analysis. 
Elite studies in (economic) sociology (Nee 2000; Rona-Tas 1994) or studies on 
innovative systems (Whitley 2007) find two dominant agents at the local level: firms and 
entrepreneurs and local government agencies who drive organizational dynamics, in form 
of selection of organizational form (Krug and Kuilman 2007), ownership composition 
(Opper 2007), corporate governance (Nee and Opper 2007; Opper et al. 2002), and as 
will be shown presently strategic decisions.  
 
The analysis of private, here: non-political, institution building reminds economists of 
Hayek’s “spontaneous order” and private voluntary business activities (see discussion in 
Aoki 2007; also Barzel 2002; Hodgson 2007). This perspective introduced findings and 
methods from social psychology into NIE, contributed to the development of 
experimental economics and institutional game theory and paved the way for recognizing 
identification and participation, bargaining and tradition in institutional change (Bohnet 
2006; Schlicht 1999). These new approaches often in combination with the concept of 
embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) and isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) became 
known as behavioral economics. 
 
The question how to link institution building at the firm and local level with institutional 
change instigated at central and political level points to a gap in institutional analysis. 
The literature on fiscal federalism (jurisdictional and yardstick competition) contributes 
some insights, but does not resolve the question whether to model the link between 
micro-level and macro-level institution building as “hierarchy”, authority sharing or as an 
evolutionary process.   
 
“Non-authorizised” forms of institution building are regarded as “informal” (North 
2005). This term is used confusingly. It can refer to cultural institutions, which are 
assumed to foster informal networking and the emergence of a private sector (Park and 
Luo 2001; Tsang 1998; Xin and Pearce 1996). The same term is also used to refer to 
illegal institutions such as black markets or corruption with strongly negative 
connotations (e.g. Rauch 1991; Tsai 2002). The alternative perspective originates in 
evolutionary economics, which acknowledges diversity, a multitude of different agents of 
change, pointing to the need to identify the specificities of social relations such as 
structures, rules, convention or organizations, (Grabher and Stark 1997; Hodgson 2007). 
From an evolutionary perspective whether an institution is formal or informal is less 
important than the link between the individual solutions and institutions (Hodgson, 
2007). Adaptation, imitation, (jurisdictional and market) competition, yet also the 
identification of “niches” where some organizational forms and business practices 
survive are the crucial analytical concerns. 
 
The analysis presented below suggests that at this stage embracing a diversity of concepts 
is more helpful than concentrating on one paradigm or one perspective. The newness of 
the kind of institutional change under economic transformation offers incentives and new 
opportunities to recombine perspectives and concepts. 
 
Having outlined the general framework of our analysis, we will next turn to the analysis 
of firms and networks. We will argue that under China’s institutional architecture 
entrepreneurship and networks do not merely react to institutional change but actively 
contribute to new institutional structures by strategically choosing organizational forms 
and investing in organizational capabilities.  
 
 
Firms and networks 
  
When in a transition economy control over resources and decision making power is 
decentralized and economic actors use the new opportunities, the question of spontaneous 
order arises. Economic actors enjoy a degree of freedom to organize themselves, establish 
firms and look for new ways outside the plan to coordinate business relations. By doing 
so, they establish a new organizational architecture (Aoki 2007) which is an essential 
component of the institutional architecture.  
 
With a rapidly decreasing state sector, explaining the rapid emergence of private 
entrepreneurship, i.e. “green-field” firms founded by ‘private’ individuals or township 
and village enterprises working outside state-planning, remains a challenge for 
organizational research on China. How firms behave, why they differ, and why some are 
more successful than others are questions central to strategic management. However, the 
emergence of firms is seldom raised in both the entrepreneurship and strategic 
management literature, as first observed by Baumol forty years ago (Baumol 1968; 
Baumol et al. 2007; see also Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Bianchi and Henrekson 2005). More 
recently, organizational ecology has drawn attention to the fact that the “blueprints” of 
the founding fathers have an influence on the firm that exceeds their own life span (e.g. 
the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies, see Baron and Hannan 2002). A second 
gap in research is that cultural and historic approaches fail to explain the heterogeneity or 
firms (within one sector) and diversity of local business systems that emerged after the 
reforms as both concepts generalize at the aggregate level of the Chinese nation state. 
Thus, for example, the claim that the Chinese family is the backbone of firm formation in 
Reform China (e.g. Redding 1996) did not pass empirical scrutiny (Pistrui et al. 2001). 
To simply assume that culture and institutions affect economic behavior is meaningless if 
there are no predictable consequences (see critique in Hamilton 2006: 7-10; Singh 2007). 
To assume that institutions are embedded in culture or that culture defines informal 
institutions (Hofstede 2007; Redding 2005) is to say that a specific behavior can be 
attributed to cultural as well as institutional factors. For example, the fact that 
entrepreneurship in China is based on collective actors connected in a network structure 
can either be taken as evidence for Chinese culture where personal relations (guanxi) play 
a major role. Alternatively, guanxi networks can be explained as a response to  
institutional factors, such as ill-functioning markets. Likewise Bohnet’s (2006) claim that 
institutions (1) create incentives; (2) co-ordinate behavior; (3) match people leading to a 
congregation of like-minded business partners; (3) affects preferences in particular 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and the relationship between the two, and (4) provide 
information on procedures (and not only outcomes) can in the same way be made for the 
functioning of culture. Research on guanxi does not contribute to our understanding of 
“culture” so long as we cannot better discriminate between institutional and “cultural” 
factors. 
 
Our research in China indicates that the formation of firms should be treated as a specific 
area of research. Firms in China are the outcome of individuals or groups (such as 
villages) pooling resources and making strategic decisions on how to build up 
organizational capabilities to best exploit market opportunities and secure a relative 
stable local institutional environment in a dynamic environment. The pooling of 
resources is not limited to physical resources or capital. As shown by Boisot and Child 
(1996) more than a decade ago, “intangible assets”, such as access to market information 
or prior knowledge about policy changes, are crucial components in the initial 
endowment of firms. Moreover, in an environment of rapidly increasing competition with 
fluctuating relative prices and incessant political change, firms opt for a strategy which 
secures maximum flexibility in recombining productive forces. One of the most striking 
features of Chinese firms, namely their willingness to disinvest otherwise profitable 
enterprises, such as restaurants or joint ventures with foreign companies, finds its 
explanation in the fact that both offer access to capital and are seen as cash cows which 
enable the investors to move to other, more  preferred sectors. Likewise the willingness 
of private firms to offer shares or influence in their operations to local government 
agencies is a move to attract stake- holders or share holders who are able to increase the 
organizational capability of a firm (Opper 2007). Firm formation in China is thus an 
iterative process that involves changes in product, labor, financial or even political 
structures with the aim to find the best adaptation to and embeddedness in a dynamic 
local environment. Combined analysis of institutions and dynamic capabilities (Dosi et 
al. 2000, Nelson and Winter 1982; see also Hodgson 2007) helps explaining the  
emergence of firms as well as specific initial resources and capabilities that leads to the 
differentiation of new firms within the same sector (Peng et al. 2008). The China 
experience supports the suggestions of empirical studies in the International Business 
literature that the institutional context of entrepreneurship and competition requires 
detailed scrutiny. Notwithstanding the merits of the competitive advantage view of firms, 
keeping institutions in the background or reflected in transaction-costs, forestalls analysis 
of how institutions function, emerge and change (Yamakawa et al. 2008). Combining an 
institutional analysis with the concepts of dynamic capabilities promises new insights, as 
has been acknowledged in the strategic management literature; for example, by showing 
that strategic political management creates firm-specific value (overview in Pearce et al. 
2008; see also Stark 1996). Our research shows that a strategy of co-opting local political 
agencies for protection of assets and business relations increases the value of all tangible 
assets plus business relations irrespective of product, sector or technology. The expected 
scale economies for investment in political ‘capital’ explains why Chinese entrepreneurs 
attach so much value to this strategy.  
 
While there is a relative deficit in the analysis of entrepreneurship, the analysis of 
networks seems to be burdened with a proliferation of concepts. Both cultural and 
institutional approaches accept that networks in China are a crucial feature of the 
business environment. The cultural essentialism which conflates Overseas Chinese 
business networks and business networks in the PRC has shown a remarkable resilience 
against the critique from China Studies which point to China’s cultural heterogeneity, 
differentiation of local business systems and variations in form and behavior of firms 
(Goodman 2007). There is a pre-disposition to believe that Chinese (but for example not 
Russian) networks are different, if not unique. The cultural approach stresses the positive 
effects of networks on economic development while in contrast, institutional and 
sociological analyses also highlight the harmful effects in form of rent-seeking and 
corruption.  
 
To describe Chinese realities, networks are frequently modeled via “as-if”- assumptions. 
To give some examples: networks are seen as “pseudo-families” (overview in Jacobs  
et.al. 2004), “old friends” (lao pengyou) (Hendrischke 2007); “clans” in terms of 
governance (Boisot and Child 1996), “state corporatist” in offering patronage (Oi 1995; 
Walder 1995), if not ’Mafia’ like (Cheung 1996) or resembling Indian business groups 
(e.g. Ghemawat and Khana 1998; see alor Rauch 2001). Networks are also analyzed in 
terms of different concepts of social or political capital (see for example Leenders and 
Gabbay 1999). These research agendas reflect different assumptions and stress different 
effects of networks, such as their ability to mobilize familial sentiments, generate trust, 
open access to information, acquire favorable regulatory terms, and mobilize resources. 
Which model fits best is in the end an empirical question. It is also a necessary 
precondition for assessing whether networking in China facilitates the emergence of a 
competitive business sector or leads to rent-seeking and corruption.  
 
The scarcity of empirical research on Chinese networks and their influence on firms has 
technical and conceptual reasons. Technical difficulties arise out of the coexistence of 
formal and informal components of networks. Thus, for example the exchange of 
political and market information is formal when firms get incorporated and when the 
chosen form of corporate governance sets incentives for stakeholders to provide such 
information (Opper 2007). The sharing and exchange of information takes the form of 
semi-formal procedures when the collusion of interests between local government 
agencies and firms offers incentives to voluntarily part with strategic information (Aoki 
2007; Hendrischke 2007; Rauch 1991); or it remains informal and confidential in a 
“favor-against-favor” swap over dinner (Tsai 2002; Yang 1994). Second, some business 
behavior is “taken-for-granted”. The conceptual problems that network participants do 
not analyze and articulate  their own routinized behavior requires a research design that 
examines different forms of networking, changes in networking activities, and social 
techniques (whether politically or socially accepted or not) which govern network 
activities. Open questions, life history of firms, and additional informal dinner talks, re-
interviewing firms after policy or strategic changes, make such a research time 
consuming and depending on close contact to those familiar with a local and firm-level 
business environment. 
  
Empirical analysis indicates that Chinese business networks are neither family based 
organizations using trust to coordinate economic activities, nor organizations based on 
the ability to overcome constraints imposed by an adverse political environment (see 
contributions in Li et al. 2002). We see them as a rational organizational response, not 
unlike diversified business groups (e.g.Hokisson et al. 2005) to an environment where the 
firm as a legal person can only rely on a limited scope of constitutional and legal 
protection (see also Carney 1998; Xin and Pearce 1996). Economic actors in such an 
environment require the ability to mobilize resources across a range of local 
organizations and power holders. As these local organizations and power holders are not 
only politically motivated, but have an intrinsic public or private economic motivation, 
local economic actors have to be able to involve them in their economic activities and 
ensure that they contribute their resources on a long term basis and receive adequate 
compensation. At the same time, economic actors prefer the degree of administrative 
interference in economic activities to be reduced to a minimum. In this institutional 
environment, public-private networks are much better equipped to achieve all these 
objectives than an independent legal entity in form of a firm. The same applies to the 
coordination among private individuals intent on establishing and expanding business 
relations. In the absence of legal guarantees, networks serve to co-opt private partners in 
order to enforce claims across jurisdictional borders. This makes them superior to weakly 
enforced legal mechanisms. Instead of firms engaging in networking activities, we find 
networks as economic actors engaging in the establishment of “open border” firms that 
suit their specific requirements. From an organization theory perspective the openness 
and fluidity of firms finds its explanation in the control of political capital as a core 
competence at par with the required commercial competence.  
 
Our empirical observations can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Networks in China are fluid, non-structured  organizational forms for co-
coordinating resources and strategic decisions (see also Peng 1997). They might 
have a social or functional group (such as investors) as a core yet expand or 
shrink according to business opportunities and constraints. Networks are 
economic actors able to activate and de-activate their membership in line with  
commercial opportunities. The dynamic capabilities of networks include the 
ability to accumulate technical and organizational capabilities and to allocate 
property rights to firms, investors, stakeholders or managers. By the same token 
property rights can be re-allocated or firms can be closed down in case of failure 
or if a recombination of assets promises higher returns. This fluid concept of 
property rights is akin to socially generated property privileges, but at the same 
time exploits the legal benefits of incorporation. It is in striking contrast to the 
legal concept of private property rights which are granted and protected 
independent of the (profitable) usage of resources.  
(2) Networks with their formal and informal information channels make it possible to 
convert informal ad hoc practices as employed between firms or between firms 
and local regulatory agencies into procedures or, by extension, into sectoral and 
formal local business standards. In this sense networks are institutional 
entrepreneurs, and initiate entrepreneurial activity that precedes formation and 
strategic decisions of firms see an interesting example in Child et al. 2007). At the 
same time, networks give voice to firms in the creation of local business 
procedures and thereby generate firm-specific value.  
 
While it is acknowledged that transaction cost economics dismisses technical reasons for 
network formation (e.g. Englander 1988; Milgrom and Roberts 1990) and externalities on 
the demand side, our research prompts us suggesting to include the further aspects in the 
analysis (see also Dow 1987):  
 
Power and authority relations. Networks as business groups where firms (Ghemawat and 
Khana 1998; Rauch 2001; Weidenbaum and Samuel 1996; Hoskisson et al. 2005) are 
established to overcome information, or enforcement problems alone, are too narrowly 
conceived. Instead we argue that networks serve as a means and strategy for co-opting 
local government agencies. Our research also warns us to assume that the closer the ties 
with local politicians or administrators, the more productive the network (see also Nee 
and Opper 2007). Our findings support the dynamic capability approach which  
concentrates on activities as a co-operative game between the local business community 
and local government agencies. This seems to be in contrast to the patron-client 
relationship in local state corporatism as formulated by Oi (1995) and Walder (1995) for 
the early reform period. In local state corporatism one partner, i.e. local government 
agencies, defines hard constraints to which the other, i.e. firms and entrepreneurs, need to 
comply (see also Jiang and Hall 1996). We don't see these as competing models, but 
rather as part of the dynamic process in which the role of players can change. Our 
concept of institutional architecture captures the fact that the two models can co-exist 
side by side in different provinces and that there can be a transition from local state 
corporatism to local business-state coordination.   
These findings which stress the effects of networking cannot lightly be dismissed as 
transitory; they rather suggest a need for better integrating the literature on principal-
agent relations, or rent-seeking with approaches on mutual dependency, but also on 
political competition and game theoretical explanations on cooperation.  
 
Social relations. Chinese networks do centre on personal relations, which may, or may 
not be mobilized for economic purposes. However, once the collaboration has outlived its 
productive usefulness, the business side of the relationships is de-activated, while the 
social side remains. It is this activating – de-activating mechanism, which allows 
economic actors to adapt quickly to changing economic situations at low cost, since the 
de-activation does not imply the end of a contract, let alone a break of the social 
relationship. The advantage of personalizing business relations (known since Coleman 
1990) lies in the fact that social sanctioning mechanisms can be hijacked for economic 
purposes. As the management science literature has shown, trust, reputation, and hold-
ups all play a role when it comes to harnessing such a form of governance (Nooteboom 
1996; 2000, Williamson 1991).  
 
Capabilities and learning. From the perspective of organization theory, the analysis 
shows that the expansion of firms and the development of industries follow dynamic 
capabilities, here understood as capabilities to actively shape the business environment  
and to recombine assets when facing changes in relative prices (Aldrich 2001;Aldrich and 
Fiol 1994; Scott 1981). By investing in co-opting local government agencies networks 
increase the value of all tangible (physical, financial) assets and make an investment 
more attractive as it promises positive returns to scale. Another advantage of the 
networks is that they function as repositories of productive slack. This function escapes 
transaction cost theory with its static concept of the firm that does not address the 
question of how a firm can move from one hybrid to another, except by pointing to the 
typology of transactions (asset specificity, frequency of contacts etc.). As in the case of 
entrepreneurship the findings suggest a combination of institutional and the dynamic 
capability approach (Teece and Pisano 1994, Langlois and Foss 1999) which would also 
help to clarify whether networks are co-operation rent generating organizations or means 
of corruption. After all rent seeking depends inter alia on the entry and exit conditions at 
the local level, (market) competition, but also on the organizational capability to for 
example force the hand of local government  agencies when they engage in ex ante 
investment while offering ex post justification for certain reform measures (Li et al. 
2006). More systematic research on networking as a business activity in different 
localities based on these approaches will help to identify the external conditions and 
internal resources which explain the organizational dynamic and its costs. 
 
In summary, entrepreneurship and strategic management literature provides conceptual 
tools to disentangle the perplexing complexity of Chinese institutions. In particular, 
dynamic analysis and “endogenizing” of networks promise better insights in the diversity 
of firms and the process by which organizational dynamics at the firm level are linked to 
institutional change at local level. Networks can be seen as the driving force behind the 
emergence of a ‘spontaneous order’ at local level that accompanies the institutional 
change as stipulated by politics and central institutions.  
 
Our findings ultimately stress the usefulness of empirical research using firms, their 
entrepreneurs and managers, but also local government officials as the main source of 
information. The potential action choices might be large but, as has been argued 
elsewhere (Aoki 2007) only a small number can be pursued in specific situations. We  
know from the concepts on dynamic capabilities that individual traits such as “visions”, 
past experience, human capital and social skills, and specific firm features, such as 
accumulated and remembered knowledge or scope of “collective action (networking) 
play a role. What we do not know is what economic actors themselves assess as most 
promising course of action. Here empirical research is needed to solicit the information 
about the direction of action (and investment) which in our fieldwork pointed toward 
access to information and strategic political management, i.e. the capability to influence 
the local regulatory regime. Only by interviewing a sufficient number of economic actors 
did we learn that Chinese firms invest first in intangible assets which they regard as 
necessary condition for any business operation. The informal nature of this kind of 
organizational dynamics is one of the main reasons for relying on interviews. On the 
basis of interviews, cross-case study analysis across sectors and localities indicates 
systematic features in the behavior of firms and entrepreneurs which when turned into 
hypothesis can be systematically tested at a later stage (see also Uzzi 1996). 
 
 
Linking formal and informal institutions through institutional architecture 
 
In the case of China organizational forms or business practices become part of the formal 
set of institution when the Party acknowledges or tolerates them. If this happens at the 
local level the new organizational forms and practices become part of a local business 
system, so long as the central level does not object. In other words, as our research has 
shown three features characterize local institution building: localism, networking and 
organizational choice. If these three elements are considered institutional building blocks 
at local level, there is need to articulate the underlying mechanism by which these 
building blocks influence the formation of institutions (Kornai et al. 2003; see also Peng 
and Luo 2000; Peng 2003)  and how they coexist and interact with central institutions 
imposed from the top. This underlying mechanism is the interplay between formal and 
informal institutions, to which we have alluded above in our discussion of networks.  
  
For China, the simple juxtaposition of formal and informal institutions does not make 
sense and needs to be expanded to include intermediate levels of formality and the 
transition from one to the other. The best starting point may be the analogy of hard and 
soft budget constraints. As with hard and soft budget constraints, we can claim hard and 
soft institutional constraints when constitutional and legal constraints (for example, the 
enforcement of property rights) exist at central government level, but their 
implementation is subject to local discretion with only limited possibilities to appeal to 
higher authorities. When local authorities are able to assume authority over aspects of 
enterprise operations without a legal basis, simply on an informal but nevertheless 
authoritative basis, or when local Communist Party cadres can override formal 
government institutions without facing negative sanctions, we might call these rules 
‘semiformal’. The authority of these political actors is not strictly formal in the sense that 
functions they assume, for example in local real estate development, may not actually be 
defined as local government tasks. On the other hand, their authority is not informal, 
because they are a constituent part of local governance. Nor is their modus operandi a 
hybrid one, because it has its own institutional logic when in operation. This wide 
spectrum of formality enables localism, social embeddedness, and organizational choice 
to structure China’s economic institutions. Institutional architecture helps us to formulate 
an institutional complexity which is not envisaged in standard Western accounts of 
formal and informal institutions. 
 
The standard Western perception of China’s institutions rests on political assumptions, 
which do not necessarily apply to China’s economic institutions. One such preconception 
is the predominance of the central state and its constitutional authority to define 
institutions at the local level. Another preconception is that social and political 
embedding of institutions occurs at central level, i.e. the notion that legitimization is a 
prerogative of the central state and transferred down to local state levels. A third 
preconception is that the organizational form of economic actors is seen to be the firm. 
These preconceptions are shared and enforced by official Chinese accounts which tend to 
focus on the country’s formal institutions and the central political set-up.  For China’s 
local economies, where the majority of enterprises are found, this framework needs to be  
reconsidered. We argue that policy signals and toleration of local diversity are important 
institutional inputs by the central state.    
 
How misleading national laws or the national Constitution can be as indicators of 
institutional change is illustrated by the issue of formal private ownership rights. From a 
legal perspective, Western observers agree with the official Chinese view that China’s 
thriving market economy has no or limited protection of private property rights. Indeed, 
up to 2004 private property rights were neither guaranteed neither by law nor by the 
Constitution. Yet this does not mean that property rights were lacking. As a result of 
gradual privatisation, property rights protection matters most at the operational level of 
enterprises (Oi 1995; Walder 1995; Krug and Hendrischke 2007), where local 
governments depend on increasing revenues. Being able to set privatisation policies and 
to lease out local economic assets, they had the means and incentives to protect well-
performing local firms by offering them contractual security on an informal basis. In 
other words, the Chinese case does not prove that property rights are unnecessary for the 
development of a market economy. China’s example proves that property rights 
protection does not need a strong central state, but can be achieved by formal and 
informal coordination and interaction between local economic and political actors. The 
weak formal protection of property rights is reminiscent of property privileges and echoes 
findings from different environments that property rights protection and contractual 
security do not need a strong central state (Dixit 2004), but can be organized by 
communities (Ostrom 1990), social groups (Greif 1993; 1998), or via private ordering 
(Ellickson 1991; Milgrom et al.1990; Williamson 2002). The claim that ownership in 
China is unprotected refers to actual legal practice at local level rather than to local 
institutional practice, as the legal perspective disregards informal or semiformal 
protection of property rights. In short, a large part of China’s institutional reality is not 
immediately obvious. In particular, informal and semiformal links between private 
economic actors and local authorities as well as links between local government agencies 
and higher layers of authority are not represented by official accounts.  
  
At local level, central authorities give way to informal institution building that involves 
local economic, political and social actors. In economic analysis, the local state builds 
and protects institutions such as property rights not as an agent of the central state, which 
issues and codifies formal rules, but based on economic self-interest and local purposes 
In this institutional set-up, local Communist Party cadres play a crucial role in mediating 
between central and local institutions and between local economic and broader societal 
interests. In their economic role, they are not tied to ideological prescriptions or the rigid 
formal government processes, but have sufficient authority to make credible 
commitments in the interest of strong local economies. Their presence and economic role 
is the strongest argument for differentiated institutional analysis. 
 
As a consequence, China’s central state does not have a monopoly on institution building, 
and economic institution building at enterprise level is not primarily defined through the 
Constitution. Devolution of institution building (as described in the Fiscal Federalism 
model) to the local level has important consequences for the national unity of economic 
institutions. It rests less on a formal conformity than on an informal political consensus 
maintained by the Communist Party which as the inheritor of long-standing institutional 
practices is an active contributor to local economic policies. The Communist Party 
maintains a political consensus that drives economic policies and is able to accommodate 
local differences in economic policies and institutions. Local differences emerge through 
the local embedding of institutions with the active involvement of local Party 
organizations. In terms of process, local economic institutions in the first instance evolve 
endogenously and take exogenous influences (including central policies) only as a frame 
of reference. More specifically, local institutions evolve through coordination between 
economic actors and local social and political agents.  
 
This institutional set-up necessarily impinges on organizational forms, in particular the 
structure of local enterprises. Local entrepreneurs do not have the constitutional and legal 
back-up that enables them to concentrate on the market alone. Instead, they face the 
commercial market as much as the institutional market (Krug and Polos 2004). Both 
require entrepreneurial attributes in terms of financial, social and human capital, alertness  
and creativity. Thus the attributes identified in the literature on competence building (e.g. 
Teece and Pisano 1994; Dosi et al. 2000; Langlois and Foss 1999), but also part of the 
research agenda on yardstick competition (Besley and Case 1995; Belleflamme and 
Hindriks 2005), apply equally to Chinese entrepreneurs, but evidence suggests that 
interpersonal coordination is better able to take care of their tasks than individual action. 
As was shown above, this type of interpersonal coordination can be modeled as networks 
which can assume different legal and organizational forms in response to different or 
changing institutional environments and in response to different organizational 
capabilities. 
 
Regarding localized institution building and informality as a matter of degree rather than 
part of a formal-informal dichotomy raises several questions when it comes to modeling 
the institutional architecture:  
(1)  Causality.  Do localism and local social capital lead to a specific form of 
organizational choice, or does organizational choice lead to localism? The Fiscal 
Federalism model (Qian 2000) suggests that localism and jurisdictional competition 
predicate organizational choice; yet studies which focus on behavior of firms   
indicate that social (and financial) capital engender localism (for an excellent study 
of the foreign trade sector see Huang, 2003). In other words, the institutional 
constraints defined by Fiscal Federalism are either not rigorously enforced, or “weak 
central government” is in fact a euphemism for local autonomy and diversity which 
require other models for analysis. The answer to this questions is related to the issue 
of 
(2)  Hierarchy. The relationship between sub-provincial localities (including local 
business systems), superior political and administrative entities and the central 
government is under-researched. For example, is the observed diversity in business 
systems and organizational forms the result of under-institutionalized, ineffective 
principal-agent relations in need of better management and management tools? On 
the other hand, is there a lack of consensus building in a non-democratic 
environment (where constitutional separation of powers and universal suffrage are 
missing)? For China, rent seeking by business communities or strategic alliances  
between firms and local politicians (acting as lobbyists) fail to explain competitive 
dynamics and economic growth, and additionally clash with the Fiscal Federalism 
model. Political science models of multi-layered government are useful tools for 
political markets (mainly in Europe), but fail to explain how this form of 
institutional architecture could emerge in China. In short, rent-seeking approaches 
dismiss too many political factors, while multi-layered government models dismiss 
too many economic factors as explanatory variables.  
(3)  Replication. Tradition or remembered (business) routines draw attention to the fact 
that the expected functional value of institutional alternatives need not be the 
decisive factor in institutional choice. If two alternatives result in identical effects, 
such as expected returns, then persuasion or appeal might be the additional reason 
for overcoming inertia or indifference. This type of (supplementary) appeal, whether 
remembered or replicated, can explain organizational and institutional variety 
(Aldrich 2001). In China’s case, there are obvious historical parallels between 
contemporary and traditional forms of local administration and local autonomy to be 
explored by evolutionary theory. 
(4)  Scale. Depending on the chosen unit of analysis, different outcomes are arrived at. 
Focusing on the aggregate level or central state policies points to changes in 
incentives and a larger opportunity set to which firms and entrepreneurs 
systematically respond. Focusing on the firm level though, points also toward 
organizational capabilities and strategies that lead to new organizational forms and 
institutions. Likewise, while the analysis of institutional change over time stresses 
the interplay between informal and formal constraints, specific institutions are seen 
as hard constraint from the individual firm’s perspective irrespective whether formal 
or informal. In short, the problem of scale is also connected to the kind of economy 
one attempts to explain: the official/formal or the total economy. The analysis of the 
informal sector is more complicated, and time consuming; and requires research 
methods, which are not part of the general tool kit in economics. Yet, the effort to 
apply alternative methodologies, such as institutional game theory, interviews or 
“analytical narrative” (Bates 1998; Greif 2006) seems a low price to pay for the 
additional insight and ability to predict future conflicts.   
 
These questions point to the research agenda which is only emerging and requires more 
detailed research in newly defined areas. However, even with these large and open 
questions in mind, certain conclusions seem justifiable even at this early stage of 
research.  
 
Conclusion: Expanding the research agenda 
  
From an institutional perspective, four findings contribute to answering the puzzles 
identified earlier. First, entrepreneurs and networks are not recipients of but also agents 
initiating institutional change when they choose and agree and organizational forms and 
business practices which become entrenched first at the local level. The strategic 
management of tangible assets such as access of information and political connections 
generates firm-specific values; differences in organizational forms of firms therefore 
cannot be reduced to different transaction costs alone. They also indicate different 
organizational capabilities. 
 
Second, without institutional analysis China cannot contribute to our understanding of 
“culture”. This does not mean that culture does not play a role. Differences across China 
reflect the effects of fiscal federalism, different organizational capabilities of firms, local 
government agencies and the cultural heterogeneity. Only by first identifying the features 
of local institutions can we expect insights in the interplay between “culture” and 
entrepreneurship, choice of organizational forms and strategies of firms. 
 
Third, the reforms granted local government agencies regulatory power and direct access 
to tax and other revenues in return for support and implementation of the general reform 
course. Different localities used this leeway in different ways depending on their local 
resource base and interaction with the new business community. The competition 
between different jurisdictions demands attention in particular with respect to the 
negative effects of vertical (centre versus local) competition and the collaboration  
between business communities and local government agencies. Principle-agent or patron-
client relations co-exist with collusion of interests better modeled as strategic games. 
 
Fourth, to acquire a comprehensive picture of China’s institutional change requires 
overcoming the informal/formal institution dichotomy by conceptualizing what we called 
institutional architecture. Dismissing institution building initiated by firms and local 
government agencies via strategic political management leaves a large number of 
transactions and business relations unexplained. By integrating informal institution 
building, the diversity across China finds an additional explanation. Moreover, informal 
institution built on strategic cooperation between firms and networks also work as 
effective tools for softening formal constraints and for establishimg alternative (hard) 
constraints. So long as organizational capabilities offer firm- and network-specific value 
and high revenues for local government agencies, local business systems reflect 
“alignment of interest” rather than politically defined “authority sharing”. 
 
All in all, on the conceptual side China makes a compelling case for combining an 
institutional perspective with dynamic capability approaches as this allows endogenizing 
politics, when it is no longer reduced to constraints and transaction costs. Analyzing 
firms and political actors and their dynamic organizational capabilities further proves 
them to be initiators of institutional change. Empirically, China makes a compelling case 
for taking firms and political actors at the local level as valuable sources for information, 
in particular with respect to informal institutions and institution building. Empirical 
research in China further suggests to embark on cross-case study analysis for identifying 
systematic features across sectors and localities, which once identified are open for 
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